WhatsappFrom the Houthis to Hezbollah, Tehran is trying to rebuild lost deterrence through its surrogates.
At a time of mounting protests and a deepening economic crisis, Iran’s regime is preparing for the possibility of an attack.
Senior officials have been dispatched to coordinate positions with the regime’s terrorist proxies across the Middle East.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is projecting above all a sense of pressure.
In a statement this week, Khamenei flatly rejected messages suggesting that “no one wants to fight Iran,” dismissing them as deception and manipulation. As a result, his aides are working to assemble a range of responses to a potential strike, responses designed to destabilize the region.
The options run from the Houthis in Yemen, through Shi’ite militias in Iraq, to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The goal, according to an Iranian regime-affiliated journalist, is not only to respond but to “confront the threat beyond the borders and not wait for it.” In other words, to activate the proxies in advance.
While Tehran weighs its moves, mass protests inside Iran are spreading.
In the port city of Bandar Abbas, reports spoke of violent clashes between residents and police. Over the past 24 hours, demonstrations and strikes have taken place in dozens of additional cities, with shops closing in protest.
Tehran’s Grand Bazaar remains a central focal point, and chants of “Death to the dictator” are heard in countless videos circulating online.
Economy in free fall
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has tightened its crackdown on the protests. So far, dozens of demonstrators have been killed, more than 2,000 arrested, and internet access restricted across much of the country.
Despite this, calls for the regime’s overthrow are only growing louder.
The economy continues to deteriorate as strikes grow, and the Iranian rial remains mired at roughly 42,000 to the dollar according to the official government rate, and 1.4 million to the dollar according to the free market rate, which is what matters for buying power inside the country.
It is not inconceivable that Khamenei and his inner circle will cling to power by all means; after all they command repression mechanisms numbering tens of thousands of enforcers.
Iran itself, however, is sinking into a vortex of chaos, violence and economic collapse. Some analysts argue these are optimal conditions for an internal coup.
Beyond the Islamic Republic’s borders, the Iranian axis is also running into difficulties in trying to leverage some of its proxies. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi landed in Beirut and is slated to meet with senior Lebanese officials, but more importantly, to hold talks with Hezbollah’s leadership.
During Israel’s 12-day “Operation Rising Lion” war with Iran in June, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem kept largely out of the picture. It is far from certain that in the next round the Iranian regime would be willing to allow that, especially if fears about its own survival intensify.
Qassem chose to absorb the killing of hundreds of his operatives in order to focus on rebuilding the organization’s terrorist infrastructure. A new regional escalation would put him in a bind.
Entering the fray would not only hand Israel the perfect justification to strike Qassem and squash the rehabilitation effort, it would expose him as an Iranian puppet who treats his own people as cannon fodder.
At the same time, reports in Iraq this week said Brig. Gen. Ismail Qaani visited Baghdad. Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force in the Revolutionary Guard, the regime’s external operations arm, was said to have met with leaders linked to Shi’ite militias.
The talks focused on the prospects of regional escalation and on a desire to keep the Iraqi arena quiet, so long as Iran itself is not attacked. Such demands complicate the position of Iraq’s Shi’ite leadership, caught between the Iranian hammer and the American anvil.
In Baghdad, officials are speaking of a U.S. veto against any candidate for prime minister associated with the militias.
The favored
These vulnerabilities among proxies in Lebanon and Iraq make the Houthis in Yemen the current “favorite son.”
In a series of meetings between Quds Force representatives and senior Houthi figures, a range of response options were discussed in the event of an attack on Iran.
On the table were terrorist attacks against shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandab Strait, as well as disruptions to communications. Even so, the Houthis have shown that their ability to inflict meaningful damage on Israel and the U.S. is limited.
The turn to proxies underscores the strategic bankruptcy of Iran’s regime. For years, its focus was directed outward in an effort to preserve psychological deterrence.
Over the past two years, with Hezbollah’s defeat at Israel’s hands, the collapse of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria, and “Operation Rising Lion” against Iran itself, that model has broken down. Even so, Khamenei appears unable to think in any other terms.
