Words from the White House might be music to the ears of the murderous mullahs and IRGC thugs.
Listening to U.S. President Donald Trump’s June 3 Oval Office press conference, one couldn’t help worrying about how his words sounded in Farsi—not only to the mullahs and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, but to the masses who believed that “help was on the way.”
Now it’s true that every statement made by Trump, whether in response to journalists’ questions or as a post on Truth Social, is aimed at multiple audiences at home and abroad. The trouble is that he often makes off-the-cuff remarks that lately have been music to the ears of the powers-that-be in Tehran.
Though he’s said about Iran that “it’s never won a war, but never lost a negotiation,” Trump has been behaving as if the joint American-Israeli military victories against the now-fractured regime were simply a precursor to engaging in dialogue with it.
On one hand, he seems to be aware that the ayatollahs and their henchmen have spent nearly half a century perfecting the art of exploiting Western assumptions about war and peace. On the other, he continues to view talks with regime representatives—mediated by Pakistan, no less—through the transactional lens of a real-estate developer.
The Islamic Republic, in contrast, sees everything through a revolutionary religious prism. The result is a clash of perceptions that’s not beneficial to the United States.
Take Trump’s explanation for Iran’s latest violations of the so-called “ceasefire,” for example. Asked by a reporter about Tehran’s attacks in the Gulf, the president replied, “Some people would say they were slightly provoked,” since the United States had struck first, and hard, the previous night.
This wasn’t merely a false depiction of what’s been going on; it was rightly interpreted by Tehran to provide an explanation, if not an excuse, to Iranian belligerence. You don’t have to be a Mideast expert to figure that out.
Nor do you require a degree in international relations to grasp that when Washington rationalizes Iranian aggression, rather than treating it as an immediate casus belli—in this case, the imperative to resume the unfinished war—Tehran concludes that its actions are paying off.
Ditto in relation to Trump’s saying, “I hear the negotiation itself is going very well, actually. Very well.”
Tehran’s translation: The White House is invested in announcing success, so our strategy is working. Let’s keep upping our demands.

Then there was his answer to the question of how he defines a ceasefire.
“Pretty much the way it is,” he said. “… [I]n that part of the world, a ceasefire is when you’re shooting in a more moderate manner. … A ceasefire there is much different than a ceasefire in other parts of the world.”
It was vintage Trump—part joke, part observation. But humor isn’t the mullahs’ strong suit.
Tehran’s translation: The Americans are already redefining success downward.
The same applied to his response to the question of whether he’s “concerned at all that the IRGC could sabotage any potential deal.”
Well, he said, “Anything can happen … when you’re dealing with Iran. … That’s a very volatile part of the world. … We could go another two-three weeks and just wipe everybody out; I’d rather not do that. … [I]f we can get something down in writing which will accomplish the same thing without killing everybody, I’d like to do that. … And we’re going to have to stop them from having a nuclear weapon. … And they’ve agreed to that. … In theory, they’re pretty close to signing a paper.”
Tehran’s translation: He no longer wants to use the military power he possesses. And the Americans still believe that getting us to “sign a paper” will create a new reality in the region.
As for whether Iran consented to help the United States “go in and dig out the buried nuclear material,” Trump said, “Well, it depends on what day you’re talking about. They did agree and then [they didn’t]. It’s very overrated. I’m the one that overrated it. I thought, to me it’s important. To other people, it’s not important, because those beautiful B-2 bombers obliterated [the nuclear sites]. That stuff is buried underneath a mountain … It’s very hard to get it. …. I still want to get it, but I don’t want to do it if we’re in conflict and put men in that kind of danger.”
Tehran’s translation: America doesn’t want to put troops at risk, so all we have to do is stall until the voices in the administration who don’t think retrieving the nuclear material is important win the argument.
Finally, Trump addressed what one reporter referred to as “a cessation of Israeli hostilities in Lebanon,” and whether it’s possible to open the Strait of Hormuz without that happening.
“We’re trying to separate it,” he said. “I mean, look, it’s a very different kind of a thing. We actually spoke with Hezbollah for the first time ever; we didn’t know they spoke. And they agreed … they’re not going to shoot; Israel’s not going to shoot. We’re just going to see.”
Tehran’s translation: Trump legitimized our proxy Hezbollah as a negotiating partner while brokering “peace” talks between Lebanon and Israel.
Assessing that the U.S. naval blockade of Iran “has more impact than the bombing,” Trump added that “immediately upon signing the Memorandum of Understanding, the Hormuz Strait will open.”
Tehran’s translation: We are being treated not as a defeated enemy, but as an enduring entity—and an equal—with leverage.
This pattern is hardly new in the West in general or in the United States in particular. What’s jarring today is having the current state of war framed in diplomatic terms by Trump, who totally rejected his predecessor’s deal with the Islamic Republic and who put his money where his mouth is by going to battle against it.
Perhaps the blather is more of a ploy than a shift toward a policy of appeasement. But even fake-outs can go just so far—especially when they take too long and embolden the murderous thugs at whom they’re directed.

Whatsapp





