WhatsappIsrael is continuing to systematically hunt down Hamas terrorists who participated in the October 7 massacre, demonstrating that the passage of time—and even a ceasefire—does not provide immunity to those responsible for the attack.
The IDF announced that a strike Saturday in Jabalia in northern Gaza killed Abd al-Fatah Abu al-Eish, a commander in Hamas’s elite Nukhba Force who participated in the October 7 invasion of Israel.
According to the military, Abu al-Eish was not simply another Hamas operative. As a Nukhba commander who crossed into Israel during the assault, he belonged to the force specifically trained to penetrate Israeli defenses and carry out attacks inside Israeli territory.
Also killed in the strike was Raed Adel Mohammed Alyan, another Hamas operative.
The significance of the operation goes beyond settling accounts for October 7.
The IDF said both terrorists remained operational threats. Despite the ceasefire, they were allegedly working to advance attacks against Israeli troops and civilians while simultaneously attempting to rebuild Hamas’s military capabilities.
According to the IDF, those activities constituted violations of the ceasefire agreement, and the strike was carried out to “remove the threat.”
That distinction is important.
Israel increasingly appears to be treating the ceasefire not as a shield protecting Hamas operatives, but as an arrangement requiring Hamas to stop preparing for renewed warfare. Terrorists who exploit the ceasefire to rebuild infrastructure, plan attacks or restore operational capabilities remain potential targets.
At the same time, Israel continues pursuing those directly connected to October 7.
This creates a strategic message extending far beyond Jabalia: participation in the massacre carries consequences that do not expire when the battlefield temporarily becomes quieter.
For Hamas, that creates a serious problem. Its ability to regenerate depends on surviving commanders rebuilding networks, recruiting fighters and restoring command structures.
Israel’s strategy appears designed to prevent exactly that.
The war against Hamas is therefore increasingly about more than destroying existing infrastructure. It is about preventing the organization from reconstructing the military machine that made October 7 possible—and ensuring that those who participated in that attack understand that Israel has neither forgotten nor stopped looking for them.
