Recent developments in the Judea and Samaria city of Hebron have brought to light new ideas on solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Five Sheikhs led by Wadee Al-Jabaari have written a letter to Israeli minister of Economy and Industry Nir Barkat. Within the letter is a proposition for the Sheikhs to secede from the Palestinian Authority and form a self governing autonomous Emirate of Hebron which would join the Abraham accords therefore recognizing Israeli independence and allying themselves with the Jewish state under their protection. The letter further outlines desires for economic cooperation between the two states allowing for Israelis and Hebronites to work in each other’s areas.
The idea of a self-governing Arab region in the Judea and Samaria which separates itself from the Palestinian identity appears at first to be something completely outside the box. In reality, tribal/clan identity has for the most part been far more important to the Arab populations of the Judea and Samaria and Gaza than that of the greater national Palestinian identity. Through a system of protection, charity, and economic means, the clan patriarchs are very much in control of their respective regions. Giving us a reason to believe that the Emirate of Hebron doesn’t just have to be a dream but an immensely successful and stable reality. To understand that this can work it is instrumental that one first understands the history of the relationship between the traditional clan system of the Palestinians and the many nationalist factions which have come about over the years.
Historically Sheikhs in the Palestinian territories as well as before the birth of Israel have been important in relieving the state of some of its functions, particularly in the more rural areas of the Levant. In the later years of the Ottoman empire they were tasked with collecting taxes and handling judicial matters. As well as being armed well enough to sustain protection in their communities from rival clans, invading armies, and banditry. The British continued this practice during the mandate years. During this time the Arab population was organizing itself politically along nationalist lines and embracing more progressive western ideas of statecraft. However, simultaneously maintaining the tribal social structure that had been in place for generations. This elevated certain families to very powerful statuses within Arab communities and outlined the factional rivalries between Palestinian nationalists. Most notably, the rivalry between the Husseini family who held the office of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and the Nashashibi family who held the office of mayor in the same city. The Husseini family believed in violent confrontation with the Jews and British to attain independence, whereas the Nashashibi favored diplomacy and negotiation. This division, although political, was split among tribal lines with the lesser clans across the region choosing sides based on which benefitted them most. This, as we will see later on, will be a repeating characteristic of Palestinian politics.
After the Israeli victory in 1948 the Palestinian population was scattered in refugee camps, and other Arab states. However, the clan identity persisted as it always had, providing protection and safety to the more vulnerable members and serving the states who house them with services for the people. With the embarrassment of defeat for the Husseini family and the embracing of more revolutionary politics new clans were elevated to power, filling out the ranks of the PLO, Black September, the PFLP, the DFLP, and many other various factions backed by various states. Although, the progressive ideals of these factions meant playing down the role that clans should have in Palestine, despite this nepotism and clientelism persisted. This empowered the children of refugees who had become separated from their clans giving them a nearly equal voice to their more noble comrades, momentarily altering the centuries old social structures of the Palestinians.
In the years surrounding the Oslo accords the well established leading families of the territories were targeted along with the IDF and Israeli civilians. Many members of the PLO, being clanless, viewed the Sheikhs and those loyal to them as traitors. As some families had cooperated with Israeli authorities between 1967 and 1993. This violence against traditional ruling families again momentarily progressed Palestinians away from clan loyalties.
Upon returning from Tunisia in the years following 1993, Arafat and his comrades attempted to rule through a more decentralized system of governance which failed to provide education, healthcare, or food to the population, due to the corruption of the local elites in both Gaza and Judea and Samaria. It further gave Arafat the ability to claim plausible deniability when it came to terror attacks on Israel at this time. While this was happening the political establishment of the PLO was siphoning off foreign aid given for the purpose of properly constructing a Palestinian state and using these funds for personal investments and assets. Leaving the territories in anarchy and bringing us to the second intifada.
In the year 2000 the second intifada began and left the territories in an even greater state of anarchy. Palestinian security forces became severely splintered turning into bands of warlord gangs looting towns and cities. The people of these areas turned to their clan patriarchs for protection, elevating the status of the clan once again to the protector of the community. These clans were well armed and in some cases better than the local security forces. These militias formed ideologies and gave themselves noms de guerre such as the Dughmush clan’s Army of Islam in Gaza.
In the years following the second intifada the decentralization of the Palestinian authority and its corruption continued uninterrupted. This created a greater need for the clans who took on their historical role as the patrons of the community. Education, healthcare, food, housing, and more were provided by wealthy patriarchs in the many clans of Palestine. Most of these men were high up in a government office or owned a business or a great deal of land which enabled them to do so. The PA recognized the importance of the clans in society and relied on them as most states have in the region for carrying out certain functions of the state. In return the clans were loyal to the PA and maintained relative stability in their region.
During the Hamas Fatah split however, both parties used the well armed clans as mercenaries, paying Sheikhs to use their men in battle and pitting rival clans against one another. In the aftermath however the clans chose either Hamas or Fatah to align with and moved to and from their homes depending on their alliances.
This leaves us with the current situation that persists to this day with Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the Judea and Samaria. Both sides are immensely corrupt and inappropriately use foreign aid and taxes for their own enrichment leaving the clans across both regions to be the only caretakers of the Palestinian people. The clan patriarchs will enlist their sons in either the Al-Qassam brigades or PA security forces as a sign of loyalty to their governing bodies and ensure that taxes are paid on time, while possibly enjoying for themselves the benefits of the corruption which persist there depending on their relationship to the ruling party.
With October seventh and the brutal war raging in Gaza, the clans are more important than ever. Particularly in the Judea and Samaria where many fear of a similar Israeli onslaught as is occurring in Gaza. No more does this fear persist than with Sheikh Jabaari and his comrades who have directed the world’s attention to the PA’s support for terrorism through financial incentives. Most notably monthly stipends to those serving sentences in Israeli prisons for committing acts of terrorism and their families as well, normally using foreign aid and tax dollars. Stoking credible fear among the Hebron Sheikhs of a possible October seventh like event occurring from Judea and Samaria. Therefore pressing the matter of political separation from Ramallah and the Palestinian identity as a whole.
The Israeli defense and intelligence communities are skeptical nonetheless of this plot that the Sheikhs have imagined. For fear of sparking a conflict between the well armed PA security forces and Hebron separatists, as well as the probability for infighting between the Hebronite clans for full control of the city. Though this is a rational reality to conceive of, it is evident that since there has been an Arab presence in the Levant the norms underlying the caliphates, empires, kingdoms, mandates, and republics have been inherently tribal and will certainly continue to be so for years to come.
By ousting the PA and Fatah from power in Hebron and maybe other areas as well you remove not only the corruption and authoritarian control, but the ideals that have never truly computed with the norms, customs, and culture of the people of Hebron and the rest of the territories. With Israeli and inevitably Gulf financial and military backing it is more than possible that the Emirate of Hebron can be the first truly stable and hopefully, safe Arab area since 1948.
In the minds of many Israelis particularly those in security there is the concern for a repeat of the 1929 massacre which saw the death of 67 Jews and injured 58. If hypothetically the population is to become radicalized by any kind of nationalism or religious zealotry. It should be noted that the Sheikhs at the time were consulted by the British to maintain order before the massacre but they refused out of loyalty to Husseini.
Though again a rational fear if the plan were to be implemented properly the militias of the Sheikhs would have to disarm giving Israel the monopoly on violence in the region. Furthermore the Sheikhs have met with settlers and representatives of the IDF in order to consult them on promises of safety for Jewish people in Hebron and to initiate cooperation between Arabs and Jews. Hebron in 1929 was a divided society where Jews and Arabs had been living in peace but also remained in their own communities. The insular nature of the Hebronite society at the time combined with the political instability of the region only served to make the divide between groups more severe and hateful. If the Emirate were to become realized it must foster a culture of respect between Jews and Arabs where values and traditions of all kinds are held in high regard regardless of how they can be perceived by either group. The monopoly on violence is crucial for maintaining stability in Hebron and for both Jews and Arabs to feel safe enough to come together in the Emirate.
Radicalization is a strong possibility and it must be combated by all means, most importantly education in both Jewish and Arab circles so as to negate the chances of dividing the two groups. This can be done with funding from Israel and other states in the Abraham Accords, though Israel must be careful of private wahhabi institutions educating Arab children as this has had disastrous effects in countries that received Saudi charity.
Though there are certainly opportunities for this plan to be a disaster. If the Israeli intel and defense communities take the correct precautions and properly monitor the allocation of funding for this project as well as demonstrate a respectful rule over the mixed population of the city. It is absolutely plausible that the Emirate of Hebron can be a proper step in the right direction towards a genuine peace.