WhatsappThe hunt for the perpetrators of October 7 continues. Nearly three years after Hamas launched its massacre against southern Israel, the IDF and Shin Bet have eliminated another commander directly involved in the atrocities of that day.
In a joint operation last week, Israeli forces carried out an airstrike in the Khan Younis area of southern Gaza, eliminating Hisham Jamal Muhammad Abu Jalalah, a platoon commander in Hamas’s elite Nukhba force.
According to the IDF, Abu Jalalah was among the commanders who led the October 7 assault on the Kissufim military outpost. He also participated in the abduction of Israelis during the massacre.
But his involvement in terrorism did not end on October 7.
Throughout the war, and particularly in recent months, Abu Jalalah continued advancing attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians. He was also actively involved in rebuilding Hamas’s military capabilities, systematically violating the ceasefire.
His elimination was therefore not simply an act of accountability for October 7. It was an operational decision designed to remove an ongoing threat.
And that distinction matters.
The international community continues to view ceasefires as mechanisms for stabilizing Gaza. Yet the fundamental problem remains: Hamas sees a ceasefire not necessarily as an end to its war against Israel, but as an opportunity to rebuild its capacity to wage the next one.
This is precisely why Israel cannot measure security by the absence of immediate fighting.
A Hamas commander who participated in the kidnapping of Israelis on October 7 and subsequently worked to rebuild the organization’s military infrastructure represents the continuity between the massacre and the next potential attack.
Removing such commanders disrupts that continuity.
The IDF emphasized that Southern Command forces remain deployed according to the existing agreement and will continue acting to eliminate immediate threats.
That statement reflects a critical principle Israel must maintain: diplomatic agreements cannot become operational shields for terrorists actively preparing future attacks.
October 7 exposed the catastrophic consequences of allowing enemy forces to build military capabilities while assuming that deterrence and border defenses would be sufficient.
Israel cannot afford to repeat that mistake.
The strategic objective must extend beyond eliminating individual October 7 perpetrators. It must ensure that Hamas never again possesses the military capability to carry out another October 7.
Until that objective is achieved, every ceasefire remains vulnerable, and every attempt by Hamas to rebuild must be treated as a potential threat to Israel’s security.
